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Abstract 
A common complaint about pacifism says that it is utopian, in a pejorative sense. The 
worry can take various forms and directions, but when it is couched in terms of Just 
War theory it usually includes accusations of pacifism’s immorality, inconsistency and 
impracticality. Contemporary defenders of pacifism have responded to this complaint 
by delineating a highly sophisticated, empirically informed account of pacifism that 
foregrounds its real-world effectiveness. This paper takes a different route towards 
vindicating pacifism: via a more nuanced picture of what is specifically utopian about 
it. I propose that peace, in at least some of its guises, can be described as a minor, 
grounded utopia; a desire for an alternative future without war and violence, whose 
pursuit blurs the boundaries between thought and action. Reconstructing both 
prefiguration and testimony as practical modes of this kind of pacifism, the paper 
maintains that minor, grounded utopias are sites rife with conflict and contestation. 
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1. Is Pacifism Utopian? 
A common and long-standing complaint about pacifism holds that it is utopian, in a 
pejorative sense. Pacifists are frequently derided as lofty dreamers, oblivious to the 
harsh realities of an evil, brutal world. Worse still, they are accused of muddled ethical 
reasoning, guilty of self-contradictory claims that quickly crumble when subjected to 
serious scrutiny. Just War theorists, amongst others, charge pacifists with revering 
ideals of nonviolence that are both unworkable and in violation of principles of rights 
protection. Adhering to nonviolence might at first sight seem like a virtuous stance, 
but a complete renunciation of violence is ultimately irresponsible. 
In recent years, a powerful response to this charge has emerged. Against the suspicion 
that pacifism is utopian, authors such as Dustin Howes (2009, 2013), Karuna Mantena 
(2012) or Todd May (2015) have insisted on another kind of pacifism; one that is 
credible, practical and eminently realistic. Interestingly, these political theorists have 
based their defenses of pacifism on the findings of social scientists who have 
investigated the effectiveness of nonviolence in a number of empirical contexts.1 
This paper contributes to the debate between detractors and advocates of pacifism by 
developing a primer for defending pacifism on explicitly utopian grounds. The main 
target of this paper is a particular way of critiquing pacifism, embodied most vividly 
by Just War theory. A connected objective is to ask how the revitalization of pacifism 
along the lines of Howes, Mantena and May could be complemented by a reflection on 
pacifism’s utopian impulse. Envisaging pacifism as utopian is helpful, I argue, so long 
as this process is staged in a minor, rather than a major key. In opposition to the 
mainstream picture of utopia, which unduly stresses the stifling perfection of a static 
end state, this minor type of utopia is uniquely suited for the vindication of pacifism 
because it foregrounds the real-world obstacles that any utopian project has to tackle. 
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Before I proceed, an important clarification on the paper’s theoretical apparatus is 
required. Since I propose a conceptual innovation that allows us to positively valorize 
pacifism as a utopian project, I take some liberty in interpreting the term “utopian” 
widely and invite the reader to follow me in this hermeneutical exercise. When I 
maintain that critics have frequently labelled pacifism as utopian, in a pejorative 
sense, I consequently aim to reconstruct a general tendency shared across many, often 
divergent positions. Some authors explicitly refer to the term “utopia” to deplore 
pacifist initiatives (Orend 2013, 247); others, however, employ notions such as 
“otherworldly” (Primoratz 2002, 221) or “unrealistic” (Sonderling 2012, 65) to 
condemn nonviolence. 
Faced with this shifting terminology, the essay hopes to introduce some analytical 
clarity. My claim is that the concept of “utopia” describes a basic disposition that all 
the critiques (and even some defenses) of pacifism have in common, namely an 
objection to the notion that war and violence can be overcome in the real world, simply 
by imagining a future in which peace would reign supreme. As we shall observe in the 
next section, this objection can be teased out in different ways and with the help of 
unique vocabularies; but underneath the variegated formulations lies a deep and 
recurring discontent with the utopian dimension of pacifism. Accordingly, I will 
subsume authors who do not overtly use the term “utopia” under this grouping so long 
as they express a functionally equivalent concern with pacifism as a form of wishful 
thinking. 
My positive proposal entails that these critics misconstrue what is utopian about 
appeals to nonviolence. Peace should be viewed as a utopia, of sorts. Its pursuit 
presupposes envisioning a future that is very different from the world we currently 
inhabit. But anticipating that future does not necessarily imply we succumb to the 
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dangerous illusion of wishful thinking. Rather, nonviolence is utopian insofar as it 
strives to excavate emancipatory potentials that are latent in the status quo. Against 
the negative reading of utopianism, the idea is hence to pay close attention to the ways 
in which pacifism is enacted through concrete practices that draw on the utopian 
imagination. 
The plan for the paper is as follows: in section 2, I outline the standard case against 
pacifism and point towards various replies that have recently been contemplated. The 
next step (section 3) detects a juncture in the midst of the utopian tradition, between 
two competing strands: a major, afloat as well as a minor, grounded one. It is a 
mistake, or so I shall maintain, to collapse the latter into the former. Section 4 explores 
the minor, grounded version of utopianism through two illustrative examples, relating 
to what I term prefigurative and testimonial pacifism respectively. My particular 
interest lies with American radical pacifist movements in the wake of the Second 
World War and with Amnesty International during its inception phase. Finally, section 
5 fleshes out some of the paper’s implications, casts a side look at anarchist politics 
and probes the benefits of a utopian perspective for analyzing counterhegemonic 
movements. 
2. Pacifism and Just War Theory: A Family 
Constellation 
Pacifism is a multi-faceted set of ideas and practices, spanning conversations over at 
least two millennia, that can be approached from two different angles. (Cady 2010; 
Fiala 2004) The first would be to focus on the morality of using violence in general. 
Correspondingly, pacifism may denote an attitude of opposing all, or at least most, 
forms of violence, in interpersonal, domestic as well as international affairs. To put it 
inelegantly, but accurately, on this account pacifism amounts to “nonviolentism” 
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(Holmes 1991), the systematic renunciation of violence in all its guises. Whether 
pacifists reject violence in an absolute fashion, or whether they allow for exceptional 
situations in which violence can be justified (such as individual self-defense or defense 
of innocent others), is a question internal to this debate. While only few authors 
subscribe to an unconditional form of pacifism qua nonviolentism, this is not an 
impossible position to hold. (Fox 2014) 
The second way to characterize pacifists would be by concentrating on their narrower, 
yet still categorical, hostility to war instead of violence. This interpretation homes in 
on campaigns for a less violent world that endorse peace activism and nonviolent 
mobilization, for example. Duane Cady describes the position, which this type of 
pacifism rejects, as “warism” (Cady 2010, 17–30), or what we would normally call 
“militarism”. On this perspective, pacifists are not necessarily dedicated to renouncing 
violence in the broader sense, but they do contest both the institution of war and the 
wider political, cultural, social and economic system that entrenches war-making. 
(Cochran 1996)  
Crucially, this second interpretation originates in an aversion to war as an activity with 
far-ranging consequences for the entire society; it is not only directed at specific wars 
with their particular justifications and rationales. (Fiala 2014b; L. May 2015; Parkin 
2018) That is to say, the reason why pacifists qua “anti-warists” dispute a particular 
reason for going to war is not do with a peculiar feature of that war. Rather, their view 
of war is so comprehensively determined by a recognition of war’s devastating effects 
that any specific war will have to be opposed. This gives rise to a political rendition of 
pacifism. (Alexandra 2003; Holmes 1999, 2015; Ryan 2015) 
The bifurcation has led some to further separate pacifism from nonviolence. (See for 
example: Howes 2013; Nepstad 2015a) Whereas the former is frequently associated 
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with an ideological, spiritual or philosophical stance, the latter is usually defined as a 
flexible tactic that groups deploy to attain certain goals. Following this line of 
reasoning, pacifism is perceived as an abstract worldview centered around a few 
unwavering convictions (“nonviolentism” or “anti-militarism”), while nonviolence 
comprises a diverse set of practices designed to sustain political action. (Bharadwaj 
1998) In contexts where pacifism underwrites nonviolent action, commentators speak 
of principled nonviolence. Parsing pacifism from nonviolence moreover implies that 
one can be a pacifist without resorting to nonviolence as a means of public protest – 
religious communities, such as the Amish, decide to remove themselves from wider 
society so as not having to battle with a social order that violates their sacrosanct 
ethics; conversely, a group might be committed to nonviolent practices without 
accepting the ideological, spiritual or philosophical underpinnings of pacifism at all. 
In this case, we speak of strategic nonviolence. (Sharp 1970, 1990, 2013) 
The conclusion revisits this distinction, contending that the shift in perspective 
encouraged in this paper also affects the way the relationship between pacifism and 
nonviolence is conceived. But at this point, I want to continue by asking why the label 
“utopian” has so often been attached to pacifists of all sorts. While I will in the 
following primarily zoom in on Just War theory, it is important to emphasize that 
pacifism has been attacked from multiple directions. Amongst the most influential 
ones are different types of realism2 and justifications of revolutionary violence3. 
Authors as diverse as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau or Frantz Fanon have all 
expressed serious reservations about nonviolence’s capacity to attain political ends. 
In light of these manifold objections, my rationale for exclusively focusing on Just War 
theory is straightforward: as a diverse tradition rooted within various cultural settings, 
Just War thinking has been consistently geared towards refining a complex set of 
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criteria to ascertain whether and under what conditions conflict would be permissible. 
(Sorabji and Rodin 2006) Its rebuttal of pacifism appears to be so compelling because 
it is anchored in a sophisticated ethics of violence: today, Just War thinking 
encompasses both historically oriented approaches, which couch the ethical reflection 
on war in terms of an ongoing dialogue between past and present ideas (O’Driscoll 
2008; Reed and Ryall 2007; Rengger 2013) and analytical philosophical accounts, 
which seek to establish the veracity of their claims mainly through thought 
experiments. (Frowe 2014; McMahan 2009)4 While it might be an overstatement to 
proclaim that Just War theory currently exerts a monopoly over the moral debate 
around war (Coates 2016, 20), it has certainly, due to its longue durée and its rich 
internal variety, mounted the most formidable challenge to pacifism. 
Within Just War theory, we can discern three key objections that feed into the 
indictment of utopianism. Following Fiala’s taxonomy (2014a), I shall highlight 
pacifism’s immorality, inconsistency and impracticality. Elizabeth Anscombe (1961) 
famously surmised that pacifism is a problematic doctrine because of its failure to 
distinguish between innocent victims and guilty perpetrators of violence. In its 
absolute, rather than qualified, rejection of violence, pacifism qua “nonviolentism” 
indirectly licenses the slaughter of the innocent. The argument here entails that 
pacifists are supposedly committed to protecting innocent life, but they fail to take the 
moral and political imperative inherent in that commitment seriously; it would be 
more appropriate, proponents of the Just War doctrine such as Anscombe opine, to 
actively protect the rights of the innocent by violent means. What is more, she 
identifies pacifism with a general attitude of escapist withdrawal from the world, 
which infringes on the Christian duty of maturely engaging with evil. Trying to keep 
one’s hands clean in an unjust world is a dishonest and futile posture. 
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Jan Narveson (1965, 1968) constructs a closely related argument when he subjects 
pacifism to critical scrutiny. He claims that pacifism is theoretically incoherent 
because it fails to appropriately act towards the objective of holding human life sacred. 
On this view, pacifists are simply incapable of drawing the correct conclusions from 
their own premises: if the ultimate goal is to honor human life and to resist its 
destruction wherever it occurs, then pacifists must be prepared to take all the 
necessary steps for pursuing that goal. Pacifism is thus charged with being logically 
self-defeating. 
The accusation of inconsistency leads directly to the final objection to pacifism, which 
is often voiced by advocates of radical politics, but has recently also been picked up in 
Just War theory (Fabre 2012): that it is simply unfit for the harsh realities bedeviling 
our contemporary condition. This view typically includes the proposition that 
nonviolence is an ideological standpoint that only the privileged can meaningfully 
defend. Polemically put, pacifism is a pathology (Churchill 1998) or a myth (Losurdo 
2015), depriving oppressed people from the only resources by which they could 
actively resist their aggressors. On this account, pacifism serves the insidious purpose 
of sheltering those in power from oppositional force. (Gelderloos 2007) A stubborn 
pledge of nonviolence undermines solidarity across counter-hegemonic groups, which 
need to deploy a diversity of tactics. (On this issue see: Frazer 2016) 
All these critiques riff on the theme that pacifism is insufficiently attuned to a world 
rampant with evil and injustice: either by abdicating the imperative of engaging with 
wrongdoing, or by declining to acknowledge the necessary implications of a pledge to 
safeguard the innocent, or by turning a blind eye to the fact of brutal oppression. Even 
though authors do not always explicitly refer to the term “utopia” when buttressing 
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their preference for Just War thinking, they base their ideas on arguments about 
pacifism’s shortcomings that are functionally equivalent to the charge of utopianism. 
In order to induce some order to this debate, we should therefore try to translate the 
three main objections to pacifism – its immorality, inconsistency and impracticality – 
into the language of utopianism. Accordingly, pacifism is denounced as utopian 
insofar as it imagines a world in which all suffering is equal (the immorality charge); 
it is utopian insofar as it imagines a world in which the pursuit of justice is self-
fulfilling (the inconsistency charge); and, finally, it is utopian insofar as it imagines a 
world in which nonviolent resistance to oppression will always be successful (the 
impracticality charge). Behind the various objections lies a discontent with pacifism’s 
aloofness and naivety: the vision of peace as a blueprint for a world without war and 
violence is simply unfit to guide real-world action. 
While it is true that Just War theory, especially in its revisionist formulation 
(McMahan 2009; Rodin 2002), continues to thrive, we can presently also detect a 
reinvigoration of pacifist outlooks. The push-back has happened along two tracks: 
positively, by rehabilitating pacifism and nonviolence as genuine options for political 
action; and negatively, by condemning Just War theory’s proclivity to degenerate into 
an exculpatory or legitimating discourse in the service of hegemonic actors. As we have 
observed in the introduction, commentators have sought to render pacifism more 
credible, practical and realistic by analyzing the panoply of feasible options that 
nonviolent actors have at their disposal when resisting oppressive regimes. This 
vindication attempts to present nonviolence as a worldly set of ideas and practices that 
is entirely compatible with a commitment to fighting evil and injustice. (Cortright 
2008, 334–39) This view is perhaps best conveyed in a passage from Dustin Howes: 
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Against the conventional wisdom, pragmatic pacifism maintains that the 
advocates of violence are prone to unrealistic ideological commitments that are 
often doomed to failure, whereas nonviolence offers a self-limiting, pragmatic, 
and realistic approach that accounts for the manifold difficulties of politics. In 
contrast to traditional pacifism, which rejects violence on moral grounds, this 
brand of pacifism relies upon political as opposed to moral principles to make 
the case against violence. Violence may be immoral, but recent empirical and 
theoretical work pushes us toward the perhaps more important insight that 
violence is counterproductive to politics. (Howes 2013, 428) 
In terms of negative critique, observers have highlighted that Just War theory can have 
unpalatable effects: making imperial efforts more tolerable to increasingly war-weary 
audiences. Despite its ambition to subject all wars to normative scrutiny, Just War 
theory has hence been attacked for its tendency to proffer all-too facile excuses for 
war-mongers.5 Proponents of Just War theory are insufficiently sensitive to the true 
horror of war; all they do is deliver handy rationalizations for a domestic audience that 
needs to be charmed into acceptance by the veneer of morality. (Butler 2012; Fiala 
2008; Neu 2017) 
Maja Zehfuss has pushed this argument to its logical conclusion by claiming that “just 
war thinking […] plays a crucial role in setting up key ways of conceptualizing the 
problem which make it possible to believe that we are doing the right thing because we 
follow our best intentions.” (Zehfuss 2018, 34) Her critique suggests that the ideal of 
an “ethical war”, which is pivotal to today’s politics in a liberal vein, is founded on a 
reprehensible delusion that can only be upheld through the ideological scaffolding of 
Just War theory. According to this account, pacifism has been deliberately discredited, 
not least by Just War theory’s success in dictating the terms of the debate about war 
and violence. The hope of these critics is that, once the notion of an “ethical war” is 
dismantled, new ways of reflecting about the global order will reveal themselves. 
These two rejoinders erect safeguards against an uncritical embrace of Just War 
theory. They remind us that Just War theory, in spite of its ostensibly skeptical 
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attitude, is always at risk of reproducing the systemic conditions in which violence is 
exercised. Although I do not wish to diminish their accomplishments, the recent 
recuperation of pacifism still strikes me as misguided in its presumption that, if Just 
War theory’s accusation of utopianism were indeed correct, then pacifism would turn 
out a problematic doctrine. (Howes 2013, 437; King 2011) After all, the strategy of 
authors such as Howes, Mantena and May is precisely to establish, with the help of 
social science, that a commitment to nonviolence is not utopian at all: it does have 
positive real-world effects that war cannot engender. 
However, this invective against utopianism cedes too much ground to Just War 
thinking. My worry is that, by rendering pacifism more credible, practical and realistic, 
these authors inadvertently reproduce and entrench the anti-utopian animus that 
defenders of Just War theory have been nurturing for a long time. By contrast, I will 
now demonstrate that pacifism’s utopian impulse is much more complex than either 
the detractors or the advocates of pacifism believe. 
3. Utopia, Split in the Middle 
Let us begin with an ecumenical framing of the utopian tradition. Ever since Thomas 
More coined the term in his eponymous novel in 1516, utopia signified at the same 
time a no-place (ou-topos) and an Arcadian place (eu-topos). The word play, 
oscillating between a simple absence and an alluring alternative, tells us something 
important about the functional structure of all kinds of utopia. As Paul Ricœur 
perceptively notes with regard to the evocative image of a nowhere: 
[A] place which exists in no real place, a ghost city; a river with no water; a 
prince with no people, and so on. What must be emphasized is the benefit of 
this special extraterritoriality. From this “no place” an exterior glance is cast on 
our reality. The field of the possible is now open beyond that of the actual; it is 
a field, therefore, for alternative ways of living. (Ricœur 1986, 16) 
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What this passage brings out is the procedural, rather than the substantive aspect of 
utopian thinking. By opening up a field for “alternative ways of living”, often through 
satire and hyperbole, utopias enable us to take a critical stance vis-à-vis the status quo. 
Varied forms of social organization shed new light on the situation in which the reader 
finds herself. 
Utopia’s critical purchase is, of course, fully recognized in the literature, but it has 
often been interpreted as either a flight from reality or as a totalitarian plot for 
forcefully creating another world: the view from nowhere as the launch pad for radical 
upheaval. Utopias can become vehicles of domination insofar as the world, here and 
now, is shown to be utterly corrupt and in need of urgent repair. Numerous critics, 
including so-called Cold War liberals (See: Müller 2008), have surmised that utopias 
are not only idle fantasies that might have distracting effects on their audience, but 
may become dangerous schemes for legitimizing social engineering on a large scale. 
Philosophers such as Karl Popper (2013), Isaiah Berlin (1997) or Judith Shklar (1957, 
1965) saw utopias in a decidedly fatalistic way: their primary objective is to prop up 
totalitarian programs for transforming society in its entirety. On this perspective, the 
imaginary anticipation of a different world is itself perilous insofar as it seduces us to 
disregard the material sacrifices that would have to be made to attain a prosperous 
future. The suspicion that utopias represent a turning away from worldly affairs is a 
commonplace in the wider discussion in social and political theory. 
Against these perspectives, it is important to insist, however, that interpreting utopia 
as otherworldly and deluded hinges on an intellectual shortcut. Utopias entail ways of 
imagining “alternative ways of living”, which do not necessarily coalesce into rigid 
templates for an Arcadian future. This point has recently been made in utopian 
studies. Several commentators, including Miguel Abensour (1999, 2008) and Russell 
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Jacoby (2005), have identified a rupture within the utopian tradition itself: between a 
highly visible strand that seeks to conjure static visions of a world to come, devoid of 
change and contestation; and a more covert, yet equally noteworthy strand that 
endeavors to draw on utopian thinking and acting so as to gain distance to the status 
quo. 
The (Cold War) liberal critique of utopianism is prone to collapsing the second strand 
into the first one, such that all types of utopianism appear as harbingers of 
totalitarianism. This is a mistake that a subtler interpretation manages to avoid, by 
referring to what Ruth Levitas calls “utopia as a method” (Levitas 2013). Levitas is 
skeptical of endeavors to define utopia narrowly, for instance by fixating on a 
particular literary genre or by placing utopianism primarily within the canon of 
political theory. Influenced by Ernst Bloch’s magisterial The Principle of Hope (1995), 
Levitas prefers a conceptualization of utopia as the “expression of a desire for a better 
way of being” (Levitas 2010, 9). She argues that a holistic reading of utopianism must 
cut across the divide between cognition and action. This implies that utopias engage 
the imagination by making up different worlds, but they also shape actual practices, 
here and now. Utopias, then, are as much about the way we think as they affect the 
way we act. As a consequence, the monolithic interpretation of utopianism is too 
restrictive, highlighting only one aspect of a rich kaleidoscope of ideas and practices 
that all qualify as utopian. 
Using the split of the utopian tradition as a starting point, let us now outline minor, 
grounded utopias. Minor utopias – a term coined by Jay Winter (2006) in his 
historical sketch of peace initiatives during the 20th century – embody cultural and 
social projects whose aim is the partial renewal of the world. In contrast with major 
utopias, which Winter associates with despotic reveries of social engineering, their 
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telos is to become incubators of change on a local, rather than global, scale. Since they 
necessarily react to particular constellations of power, minor utopias reflect the 
material and ideological conditions from which they emerge.6 Winter probes this 
dialectical movement by tracing a fundamental tension within utopianism: 
First, it [utopianism] is a narrative about discontinuity. It is a story through 
which men and women imagine a radical act of disjunction, enabling people, 
acting freely and in concert with others, to realize the creative potential 
imprisoned by the way we live now. But secondly, since the narrative is written 
by men and women rooted in contemporary conditions and language, it 
inevitably shows where they are, even as it describes where they want to be. 
Utopias force us to face the fact that we do not live there; we live here, and we 
cannot but use the language of the here and now in all our imaginings. (Winter 
2006, 3) 
One way in which these minor utopias are constitutionally grounded is therefore with 
regard to the contexts from which they try to escape – the “language of the here and 
now”, in Winter’s words, cannot be simply left behind like an old coat. Although 
utopias may appear unattached – consider how many early modern utopias are set on 
islands – they in fact remain tethered, often in surreptitious ways, to the material and 
symbolic universe that they reject.7 Whereas major utopias obfuscate this tethering by 
attempting to altogether transcend the strictures of the present condition, minor 
utopias openly acknowledge the dialectics at play when experimenting with alternative 
ways of living.8 
But utopias are grounded in another respect as well: via the everyday experiences of 
the people enacting utopian visions through practices of resistance and dissidence. 
(Davis 2012) Instead of merely scrutinizing the abstract ideas behind political action, 
grounded utopianism describes how particular social milieux can be turned into 
spaces for emancipatory practices. Accordingly, Davina Cooper has recently examined 
utopias through the lens of quotidian encounters in settings designed to foster 
communal promise and hope. Cooper defines these sites as everyday utopias, 
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networks and spaces that […] perform regular daily life in a radically different 
fashion. Everyday utopias don’t focus on campaigning or advocacy. They don’t 
place their energy on pressuring mainstream institutions to change, on winning 
votes, or on taking over dominant social structures. Rather they work by 
creating the change they wish to encounter, building and forging new ways of 
experiencing social and political life. (Cooper 2014, 2) 
Far from being figments of the imagination, grounded utopias thus strive to actualize 
the utopian desire for change, here and now. This drives them beyond the realm of 
cognitive processes into the sphere of contentious politics, albeit on a small scale. 
While social transformation might be an ulterior ambition of minor, grounded utopias, 
their chief objective is to salvage, through “alternative ways of living”, emancipatory 
potentials from within existing power structures.9 
Viewed from this vantage point, it becomes clear why both detractors and advocates 
of nonviolence are too quick to dismiss pacifism’s utopian impulse. If utopianism 
pertains to both imagination and action, then we can interpret at least some 
nonviolent movements and initiatives as utopian in a non-pejorative sense. 
Accordingly, a few authors have contended that pacifism and utopianism are bound 
up with one another. Tom Moylan, for example, proposes that Levitas’s conception of 
utopia as a method can helpfully illuminate social movements. On this account, both 
principled pacifists and campaigners for strategic nonviolence resist oppression by 
embodying the change they want to see in the wider world: “In challenging 
oppositional violence and exemplifying alternative nonviolent manoeuvres, they 
function as a strategic or at least a tactical vanguard, as a utopian sensei or even a 
utopian ‘commissar’ whose methods are dialogical and not centralist.” (Moylan 2015, 
190) 
Stellan Vinthagen surveys related terrain with his concept of “utopian enactment” 
(Vinthagen 2015, 206–54). His suggestion, inspired by both Gandhi himself and the 
Gandhian philosopher Richard Gregg, is to scrutinize the efforts of the activist in terms 
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of dramatic performances that anticipate a peaceful future. When the activist refuses 
to use violence in her practice of resistance and refusal, she elects to suffer the painful 
consequences of violent repression. Yet, pace Just War theory, this suffering is not a 
private decision to keep one’s hands clean, but fulfils a demonstrative function by 
“[t]rying through […] ‘as if’ actions to apply the nonviolent future in the present, 
precisely where this is most difficult, near violence and oppression.” (Vinthagen 2015, 
253) 
In sum, the notion of minor, grounded utopia deviates along two axes from the 
standard picture of utopia as a blueprint: Minor utopias are, firstly, distinct from 
major utopias owing to their acknowledgment of the limitations that the here and now 
imposes on the aspirations to build a better future. Secondly, grounded utopias differ 
from afloat utopias in that they link imaginative strivings to everyday practices. Taken 
together, these two features help us retrieve a meaning of utopianism that both the 
critics and the defenders of pacifism have thus far missed: an empowering vision for 
creating another world that works through the contradictions of the status quo, 
without succumbing to the dangerous illusion of wishful thinking.10 
4. Two Modes of Pacifist Utopianism: 
Prefiguration and Testimony  
We can further sketch the contours of peace as a minor, grounded utopia by 
concentrating on two of its enactive modes: prefiguration and testimony. While they 
are related to each other, prefiguration and testimony are situated at the extreme ends 
of a spectrum of activities that characterize pacifist utopianism. They set into motion 
different ways of performing, rather than merely speculating on, pacifism, moving 
back and forth between cognition and action, between contemplating and doing, and 
between the future and the present.  
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In the most general terms, we may describe prefiguration and testimony as follows: 
prefigurative pacifism strives to promote nonviolence “as if” a world were already in 
existence where violence was utterly discredited as a means to attain political ends. 
Several authors have noted, with respect to recent social movements, that 
prefiguration serves various interconnected goals: by employing horizontal decision-
making procedures, activists endeavor to “build the new society in the shell of the old”. 
Such anticipatory action is supposed to transmit a strong signal to society at large that 
its hegemonic order, in which democracy has been hollowed out, is utterly fraudulent. 
(Boggs 1977; Kinna 2017; Leach 2013; Sande 2015; Yates 2015) 
This communicative function is also central to testimonial pacifism. (Martin and 
Varney 2003) Testimony can be located at the other end of the spectrum: through the 
public witnessing of violence, a system of oppression is laid bare to wider society so as 
to provoke a shock that will move the audience into a peaceful future. Providing 
testimony is not the same as standing by in passivity. Peace witnesses hold up to 
society a mirror that is designed to reflect reality back on those who engage in violence 
and on bystanders who avert their eyes to remain unaffected by their surroundings. 
(Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2005) Crucially, even though “acting as if” and 
“bearing witness” appear like polar opposites, they share a vital feature: their 
orientation towards a world of nonviolence supplies a critical tool for uncovering 
problems concealed within the status quo. 
Let us now refine this abstract model by unpacking two examples. My goal here is to 
study in some detail whether the framework of minor, grounded utopianism, with its 
emphasis on working through the contradictions of the status quo, can be conducive 
for better understanding both “acting as if” and “bearing witness” as pacifist strategies. 
Before proceeding, a word on case selection and discussion. The two examples have 
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been chosen because they operate through practices of prefiguration and testimony 
that exhibit the tenets I identified with minor, grounded utopianism. The purpose of 
this section is not to paint a fully comprehensive picture of prefigurative and 
testimonial enactments of pacifism; nor is it to glorify particular social movements and 
issue a stern judgment on others. Rather, I hope to demonstrate that the framework 
of minor, grounded utopianism can shed light on nonviolent activism, illuminating 
both its successes and its failures. That the inherent complexity of each case will have 
to be reduced for presentational reasons strikes me as inescapable. 
To commence with our first example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, a number of 
radical pacifist movements, such as the Committee for Non-Violent Revolution, the 
Committee for Non-Violent Action and the Peacemakers, sprung up in the US. 
(Cortright 2008, 109–25) Any form of violent behavior during their protests was 
prohibited from the get-go; resistance was to be marshalled on strictly nonviolent 
grounds. Facing fierce opposition from the state and opprobrium from society, these 
groups sought to turn themselves into catalysts of transformation. Given the 
widespread patriotism in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and the 
concomitant attrition of pacifist sentiments, their strategy involved the creation of 
small-scale cells that internally adhered to the kind of peace and democracy they 
wished to spread across society. (Danielson 2015) 
Like Gandhi, the radical pacifists maintained that nonviolence was ultimately more 
efficacious in prompting social transformation than violent resistance. Associating the 
pacifist calling with the underground activities of early Christians, A. J. Muste, a 
Dutch-born leader of the Peacemakers and vehement critic of the emerging doctrine 
of Cold War realpolitik (Danielson 2006), assessed the situation in rather bleak terms: 
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It seems altogether likely that building a radical pacifist movement of any size 
will be a tougher and slower job in the U.S. than anywhere else […] [W]ill 
reaction prove so strong in the U.S. that we have to keep a small remnant alive 
[…] a church in the catacombs pattern? (cited in: Polletta and Hoban 2016, 289) 
It is essential to remark that these groups openly espoused the terminology of 
utopianism to explain and justify their politics. As Francesca Polletta observes, the 
radical pacifists believed that “[a]n honest utopianism […] had to be a part of a radical 
politics worthy of the name – but a utopianism that refused to withdraw from the 
political world” (Polletta 2002, 38). Their worldly engagement hence corresponds 
with the minor, grounded utopianism theorized above. 
So how did the radical pacifists concretize their utopian project? The internal structure 
of these movements was based on egalitarian principles that were supposed to 
anticipate the non-oppressive order they were aiming to institute within society at 
large. The plan was precisely to prefigure in their actions the world they planned to 
bring about through canvassing and lobbying, hoping that the old shell would wither 
away once the new world was born within. 
However, their deep commitment to a non-hierarchical organization frequently came 
into conflict with the public mission of mobilizing for peace. The dilemma was clear: 
since these groups were politically and socially marginalized, they were compelled to 
turn inwards for keeping the momentum going and for bolstering the members’ 
morale. At the same time, those who were affected by the message of nonviolence 
needed to be addressed in such a way that they immediately grasped the attractiveness 
of the alternative world imagined and enacted by pacifists. 
This friction points to a dilemma pervading the collective identity of social movements. 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 4) The difficulty for activists facing an intensely 
adverse environment is how to persuasively speak to the people in the wider public, 
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without compromising the group’s internal integrity and without weakening the grip 
of the collective’s foundational values. Although the radical pacifists in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s were not trying to become mass movements, they still struggled to 
negotiate the tension between an inward-looking consolidation of egalitarian ideals 
and an outward-looking strategy for advocacy. This tension became most palpable 
when their commitment to collaborative relationships negatively influenced external 
constituency-building. As a consequence, their peculiar brand of pacifism made them 
vulnerable to strong leadership claims, which ran counter to self-professed 
benchmarks of non-hierarchical organization. (Polletta 2002, 41–42) 
In many respects, these groups’ activities and initiatives were admirable. They bravely 
stood up against a political establishment and a societal mainstream that identified 
peace with cowardly appeasement; they experimented with ways of cooperating that 
intended to maximize inclusion and horizontality; they were fearless in their 
employment of nonviolent forms of protest. Through their anticipation of a peaceful 
future, these groups performed a critical function in the postwar era. (Danielson 2008) 
Later, they would have substantial impact on the Civil Rights agenda and especially on 
Martin Luther King Jr.11 
Yet, the radical pacifists were also working through precisely those contradictions that 
permeated the wider public in the US after the Second World War (and even today, 
one might add). The main fault-lines in their activism ran along largely predictable 
divisions: gender and race. While they endeavored to abolish hierarchies within their 
ranks, the protagonists of these groups assumed, often unreflectively, a cultural 
homogeneity within their organizations. As Polletta remarks, “[w]hen pacifists talked 
about democracy within their organizations, they meant among people with similar 
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ideological commitments, formal education, and political expertise.” (Polletta 2002, 
43) 
While inclusion and horizontality were thus objectives of their prefigurative politics, 
the basis for who would get recognized was still shaped by the gendered and racialized 
matrices that structured the societal mainstream of that period. Women occupied 
especially uncertain positions within this utopian setting: they were openly valued as 
equal members in the struggle for peace, playing important roles in the above-
mentioned groups; but their very presence also stretched the notion of universal 
“brotherhood” to its breaking point. In the words of another commentator: 
[T]he activism promoted by the radical pacifist movement was a highly 
gendered phenomenon that shaped the experience of women and men in 
different and unequal ways. Male activists actively promoted a definition of 
pacifist action that equated political militancy with a rough and rugged style of 
heroic manhood. In their hands, political protest became a way to defend and 
define their masculinity – a type of direct action identity politics disturbingly 
similar to that promoted by the culture of militarism, which identified self-
sacrifice and courage as the primary markers of manly citizenship. (Mollin 
2006, 3, see also: 2009) 
The unsure standing of African-Americans resembled in some respects that of women. 
Although eradicating racial segregation was one of the key targets of groups such as 
the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) – orchestrating, for example, the so-called 
Journey of Reconciliation in 1947, a two-week bus ride through Southern states 
governed by Jim Crow laws (Catsam 2009) – the actual results of these campaigns 
must be deemed mixed at best. Albeit an interracial group from the start, CORE’s 
leadership was mostly white (and exclusively male), “committed to a race-blind 
‘brotherhood of man’, but not yet sure of how to make concrete contributions to the 
black freedom struggle.” (Mollin 2004, 122) 
Even though we must not overlook the contributions of alternative peace initiatives 
run by black women (McDuffie 2011), the most influential groups in the wake of the 
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Second World War clearly failed to relinquish the racial divide they were attempting 
to abolish in society at large. The political language of universalism underpinning their 
pacifist agenda, apparent in the color-blind invocation of an all-encompassing 
“brotherhood”, made a genuine alliance with those resisting the oppression directed 
at African-Americans almost impossible. It would take the Civil Rights movement, 
more than a decade later, to rearticulate universalism in such a way that the struggle 
for black freedom could finally gain traction. (Hall 2005) 
My second example concerns one of the most prominent NGOs today: Amnesty 
International. In the following, I concentrate on Amnesty’s early years during the 
beginning of the Cold War. The focus here is specifically on Amnesty’s foundational 
principle of bearing witness to human suffering, which is also central to other human 
rights NGOs, such as Médecins sans Frontières, for example. (Redfield 2013) 
While Amnesty is usually not considered a pacifist organization, the unconditional 
pledge to nonviolence featured prominently in its historical development. This 
becomes especially apparent when we look at a public figure who Amnesty initially did 
not recognize as a prisoner of conscience: Nelson Mandela. Although he was eventually 
offered the “Ambassador of Conscience” award in 2016, in 1964, when he was 
sentenced to life in prison, Mandela’s name had not been included in Amnesty’s list of 
prisoners of conscience. The justification for this decision was Amnesty’s erstwhile 
dismissal of any form of activism or policy that propagated violence, even when 
targeted at oppressive regimes. (Clark 2001, 14; BBC News 2006) This is the sole 
reason why Mandela was denied the status of “prisoner of conscience”: as somebody 
who had openly encouraged violent resistance against the Apartheid state, his 
suffering – while authentic and undeniable – was simply not deemed “unjust”. 
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Mandela’s story thus speaks to the centrality of nonviolence within Amnesty’s ethico-
political universe. 
In order to grasp the importance of this point, we require some historical background. 
Amnesty was founded in 1961, by the British lawyer Peter Benenson, a converted 
Catholic of Russian-Jewish descent. (Buchanan 2002, 2004) Benenson’s energy had 
been channeled at prisoners of conscience – those subjected to state violence merely 
on the basis of their beliefs and convictions. The means Amnesty employed in its 
activism, at least during its initial phase, was detached objectivity in research and 
reporting. During the early 1960s, Benenson, and those supporting his mission, was 
adamant about the need to keep equidistance to the Great Powers embroiled in the 
Cold War. In that vein, Amnesty was supposed to operate on an “extra-political” 
platform, standing in solidarity with prisoners of conscience around the world, 
without having to endorse any particular creed or worldview. This constituted the 
normative basis for Amnesty’s reliance on unbiased research into infringements on 
civil and political rights, which would further consolidate its “moral position, that of 
the apolitical, neutral, impartial observer” (Hopgood 2009, 242). 
To comprehend the purpose of testimony in backing detainees, further historical 
context is needed. Bearing witness has always played an important role for pacifists, 
perhaps most famously in the Quaker movement. (Ceadel 2014; Dandelion 2008; 
Smith 1996) The Quaker view holds that it is a Christian duty to oppose war in the 
broadest possible sense. Testimony is part of its strategy for resisting the advocacy for, 
and contribution to, war. Amnesty’s founders were heavily influenced by this religious 
coloring of pacifist activism. The pervasiveness of spiritual symbols also manifests 
itself in Amnesty’s official logo, a burning candle surrounded by barbed wire. (Lahusen 
1996, 239) 
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Fashioning itself as a beacon of apolitical, neutral and impartial objectivity in a 
turbulent sea of conflicting creeds and worldviews augmented Amnesty’s reputation 
over time, culminating in a sort of secular religion – a quasi-spiritual organization 
whose doctrinal core is held together by a deep faith in the sanctity of human rights. 
Stephen Hopgood, who introduced the phrase secular religion to portray Amnesty’s 
institutional culture, grasps the basic dynamic succinctly: 
Amnesty’s lack of building blocks – its social and geographical separation from 
any specific national social class or group – created an initial detachment. Its 
growing symbolic role as a universal flame-bearer then edged it toward rules, 
procedures, and finally doctrine that maintained moral authority by elevating 
the idea of impartiality to an organizational imperative. It sought to construct 
in practical terms the kind of space – above, beyond, outside the world – in 
which the idea of objective morality of a kind of universal truth, could be 
anchored. (Hopgood 2006, 60) 
The emphasis on carving out a space “above, beyond, outside the world” foregrounds 
the utopian aspirations of Amnesty’s testimonial pacifism. Observing politics from 
such a transcendent position is premised on imagining an alternative world that looks 
radically different from the present moment. When the peace witness faithfully 
records what is happening here and now, her evidence, preserved for future 
generations, performs a commemorative function. For testimony to call attention to 
structural wrongdoing, distance must be maintained between the observer and the 
observed, the activist and the sufferer. The epistemological status of truth-telling thus 
depends on the researcher-activist protecting her vantage point from undue 
distortions and biases. Amnesty’s reports therefore resemble investigative journalism, 
or indeed academic inquiry, in that the singular norm governing them is the falsifiable 
truth of what is being conveyed. Its “interpretive capacity” (Clark 2001, 16–18) relies 
on giving an accurate and perspicuous account of frequently inchoate patterns of 
human rights violations. 
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The celebration of detachment and objectivity has repercussions for how the suffering 
subject is represented. If testimony is to generate the desired effect of garnering public 
support, human suffering needs to be depicted in a clear-cut way that leaves little room 
for doubt about perpetrators and bystanders. The victim’s absolute innocence is key 
to the smooth operation of “humanitarian reason” (Fassin 2012). Innocent life is 
thereby elevated to a sacralized status, for instance through the many images of 
children and women in Amnesty’s reports; reports that are meant to elicit visceral 
responses from the audience. Call this the totemic dimension embedded within the 
human rights imaginary. (Hopgood 2013, 69–72) 
A difficulty for this model of impartiality arises from the way Amnesty’s core mission 
is simultaneously facilitated and constrained by the guiding principle of truth-telling. 
The predicament appears to be this: for testimony to lead to positive results, 
detachment must not feel like cold-hearted indifference; dispassionate distance to the 
suffering subject must not evoke a sense of isolationism; the observational stance must 
not eclipse the activist’s moral outrage. Later on, especially during the genocide in 
Rwanda, the tension stemming from the very idea of testimony would cause a severe 
crisis in Amnesty’s “ethos-in-action” (Hopgood 2006, 76); a crisis, which has arguably 
been exacerbated during recent wars in the Middle East. 
These two cases tell us something about the peculiar appeal of prefiguration and 
testimony as modes of pacifist utopianism. Both “acting as if” a peaceful order was 
already in place and the method of “objectively” documenting human suffering spring 
from the desire for a different world. They unfold a space beyond the here and now 
within which prefigurative and testimonial practices can become effective. But this 
space, albeit utopian in essence, is not the product of wishful thinking. Prefigurative 
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and testimonial actions are deeply embedded in the world as we know it; they occupy 
ambiguous sites, rife with conflict and contestation. 
What is distinctive about both kinds of utopian pacifism is that they deliberately 
confound, albeit in different ways, the trajectory leading from the present moment’s 
violence to an uncertain future. The feminist activist and scholar Elise Boulding has 
dealt with this issue through her pioneering work on the human capacity to produce 
images of concrete alternatives to war.12 Such future-oriented visions can galvanize 
struggles in the here and now, by debunking the potent myth that making war is simply 
humanity’s destiny. Other feminist thinkers have pursued similar lines of reasoning, 
stressing that pacifism aims to “construct an alternative to war by addressing the 
conditions that make it seem that war is the default mechanism for securing justice” 
(Hutchings 2018, 185)13. Importantly, this utopian mode of thinking about alternatives 
should not be mistaken for a predictive method: its main purpose is to inspire change 
in the face of massive obstacles, not to forecast what the future will eventually bring. 
What makes both the radical pacifists in the aftermath of the Second World War and 
Amnesty International minor, grounded utopias, is their inability to escape the 
predicaments they attempt to resolve. They envisage nonviolence as a viable and 
indispensable alternative to the status quo; nonetheless, in their quotidian encounters, 
they also remain mired in the “very contradictions they seek to supersede” (Winter 
2006, 7). Their worldly orientation goes hand in hand with a rejection of what I have 
called major and afloat utopianism above – the search for a static blueprint that knows 
no dispute or transformation. 
For the radical pacifist groups in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the continued 
prevalence of male, white leadership threw into sharp relief the limitations that the 
language of universal “brotherhood” imposed on their institutional culture and 
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decision-making procedures. While inclusion and horizontality were officially 
celebrated, the boundaries of equality were drawn along culturally dominant 
coordinates, with the effect that minorities could not occupy leadership positions. 
Consequently, outsiders within the organization, especially women and African-
Americans, remained largely disempowered. 
The case of testimonial pacifism relates a different story. Although human rights have 
been called the “last utopia” (Moyn 2010) – a morally pure counterpoint to a world 
ravaged by dangerously divisive ideals – an investigation of Amnesty’s pledge of 
impartiality opens up another perspective. Bearing witness involves an ethos that is 
predicated on “extra-political” truth-telling. This is the essence of its “self-imposed 
limited mandate” (Baehr 1994). Yet, in reality the imperative of enunciating in public 
nothing but the truth runs the risk of appearing overly anemic, menacing the core 
mission of an activist NGO that strives to make the world a better place.14 Traversing 
the gulf between the epistemic demands of truth-as-testimony and the duty to 
positively intervene to alleviate human suffering marks out Amnesty as a minor, 
grounded utopia. Amnesty intends to speak from a place beyond politics, but the 
reality of human suffering, “unjust” or otherwise, necessarily forces them back to the 
ground of compromise and concession. 
5. Fail Again, Fail Better 
What wider lessons can we learn from these examples of prefiguration and testimony? 
My proposal in the concluding section is that envisaging pacifism as a utopian project 
helps us to appreciate why social movements and NGOs engaged in nonviolent 
struggles often seem to falter, or at least to fall short of the aspirations they set 
themselves. One consequence of what I have claimed so far is that, when debating 
nonviolent initiatives, we should refrain from tracing their shortcomings back to 
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pacifism’s intrinsic immorality, inconsistency and impracticality. Just War theorists 
of different stripes have pursued this denunciatory scheme, without seriously 
considering whether a more differentiated account of utopianism would weaken the 
critical thrust of their objections. Insofar as utopian pacifism remains bound by the 
conventions it aims to transcend, what we perceive as failure should be more 
appropriately comprehended as an upshot of the complex negotiations between the 
strictures of the contemporary condition and the promise of an anticipated future. 
(Jameson 2000) To paraphrase Samuel Beckett, failing again, but next time better, 
might hence be a suitable motto for this kind of pacifism.15 
Here, a side look at anarchist politics can illuminate the advantages of the framework 
delineated in this essay.16 In David Graeber’s apologia of the Occupy Movement, we 
discover an instructive account of why the actual accomplishments of anarchist 
politics are often met with silence in the public sphere. (Graeber 2013) Against the 
predominant view that the pacifist protests of 1968, for example, were a complete 
disaster in terms of tangible policy impact, Graeber insists that many of the demands 
put forth by the anti-war movement had delayed ramifications that can still be felt 
today.17 Graeber condenses this view in the following words: 
Clearly, an antiwar movement in the 1960s that is still tying the hands of U.S. 
military planners in 2012 can hardly be considered a failure. But it raises an 
intriguing question: what happens when the creation of that sense of failure, of 
the complete ineffectiveness of political action against the system, becomes the 
chief objective of those in power? (Graeber 2013, 278) 
This last sentence reveals a tantalizing prospect: that the depiction of pacifism as 
pejoratively utopian serves specific interests, most notably the pre-emptive 
condemnation of nonviolence as immoral, inconsistent and impractical. Viewed from 
this vantage point, a different set of responses to Just War theory takes shape. Recall 
how Just War theorists present their normative assessment of warfare as a more 
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responsible reaction to a global constellation where evil and injustice cannot simply 
be wished away. Once we foreground the minor, grounded utopianism within pacifist 
movements and initiatives, Just War theory loses at least some of its compelling 
character. For we can now grant that utopian thinking and acting is not always capable 
of comprehensively resolving all the contradictions of the status quo. Indeed, following 
Winter’s and Cooper’s reflections, we might conclude that minor, grounded utopias 
are by default contentious and imperfect; they are bound to be assembled within the 
force-field of extant power structures. 
This admittance has repercussions for how we conceive of counterhegemonic 
campaigns more broadly. Naturally, the fact that women and African-Americans could 
not obtain leadership posts within radical pacifist groups such as CORE or 
Peacemakers should make us skeptical of their progressive agenda; equally, the fact 
that peace testimony can, and often does, lead to a complacent retreat from the world 
must be a cause for concern to all those who want human rights to become tools of 
emancipation. 
Nonetheless, viewed through the framework of minor, grounded utopias, both issues 
are symptomatic of the ways in which prefiguration and testimony function as 
incubators of real-world change. The creators and inhabitants of minor, grounded 
utopias seek to distance themselves from the status quo, through complex ways of 
anticipating alternative futures; but they inevitably remain entangled in the 
contradictions that they aspire to resolve. 
Espousing the maxim of “failing better” thus entails that we perceive both the 
successes and the failures of pacifist projects as temporary stations on a continuous, 
yet rocky journey. Trying to imagine and occupy utopian spaces is an experimental 
endeavor, full of promises and disappointments. While it would be inaccurate to depict 
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this journey as a linear, steady learning process, prefigurative and testimonial 
practices do possess an iterative dimension that enables nonviolent actors to gain 
awareness of the pitfalls of inaugurating real-world change. The perspective of minor, 
grounded utopianism then allows us to judge their performance in a nuanced manner, 
which is not only sensitive to their shortcomings, but also appreciative of their 
accomplishments. 
This observation casts light on the distinction between pacifism and nonviolence, 
which we have encountered in section 2. Against the current tendency to pit them 
against one another, my analysis indicates that the contrast between principle and 
strategy is less stark than often assumed. Although it is, of course, correct that “[t]hose 
who engage in nonviolent action hold a variety of different beliefs, one of which may 
be pacifism” (Schock 2003, 705), it seems also apposite to point out how ideas and 
practices affect each other in minor, grounded utopias. 
As we have seen, prefiguration and testimony inexorably alter the relationship 
between the means and the ends of political action. Rather than merely seeking to 
determine the most appropriate means for achieving their chosen ends, proponents of 
minor, grounded utopias contest the very notion that we can neatly separate means 
from ends. As a consequence, it will in concrete moments perhaps be possible to hold 
apart pacifism as an ideological, spiritual or philosophical stance and nonviolence as 
a means-oriented tactic; but the benefits of differentiating between pacifism and 
nonviolence are not always clear in cases such as the ones discussed in this paper. 
Without denying the potential value of the distinction in other contexts, I would 
therefore suggest that, within minor, grounded utopias, pacifist principles and 
nonviolent strategies are inextricably bound up with one another, to an extent that 
trying to unravel them can seem like a pointless exercise. 
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The significance of adopting this perspective for contemporary politics, beyond the 
two cases discussed above, is considerable. In underscoring the utopian impulses in 
social movements and initiatives, we are able to overcome a simplistic framework 
whereby the tensions resulting from minor, grounded utopias are taken to be 
intractable. To explain this further, I will gesture towards just one example that 
discloses the broader potential of my proposal. While the essay’s conclusion cannot be 
the place to unpack this multifaceted project in any kind of detail, consider for a 
moment Black Lives Matter. (Lebron 2017) One fruitful approach for making sense of 
its anti-racist resistance is, in Melvin Rogers’s words, to view it as a “utopian […] 
exercise of our moral imagination, struggling to be realized in practice” (Rogers 2016). 
Its commitment to a “pragmatic utopianism” (Dawson 2013, 194–200), which 
inventively combines bearing witness to state violence and the anticipation of a less 
oppressive future, exposes one of the many parallels between Black Lives Matter and 
the wider tradition of black radicalism. (Kelley 2002; Bailey and Leonard 2015) 
Looking at Black Lives Matter through the prism of a minor, grounded utopia lets us 
appreciate its freedom struggle, in spite of its many set-backs and uncertain future, as 
a dynamic form of social dreaming. (K.-Y. Taylor 2016) 
Finally, we can also ponder how my case for bolstering pacifism relates to the above-
mentioned attempts of rendering pacifism more credible, practical and realistic. As 
should be evident, I do not believe that conceiving of pacifism as utopian is at odds 
with these proposals. In the critique of Just War theory, my essay thus joins up with 
the ambitions of Dustin Howes, Karuna Mantena and Todd May to re-orient the 
ethical reflection on violence. Like these authors, I, too, have sought to steer attention 
towards enactments of pacifism that try to exert a positive impact on the world as we 
know it. But this paper has also claimed that a vital aspect of nonviolence gets lost if 
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we conceive it primarily as a means-oriented technique in the arsenal of contentious 
politics. There is something positively utopian about pacifism, which even its 
defenders habitually ignore. Grasping this aspect, in all its complexity, is a 
precondition for analytically understanding, normatively vindicating and actively 
encouraging struggles for a nonviolent future. 
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Endnotes 
1 The strength of their rejoinders therefore rests, at least to a certain degree, on large-
N quantitative analyses confirming the efficacy of nonviolent forms of protest and 
resistance. See representatively: (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011; 
Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Lawson 2015; Martin 2015; Nepstad 2015b; White et al. 
2015). 
2 The term “realism” here covers a great variety of positions within political theory and 
international ielations. These range from a Christian type of realism, perhaps most 
famously embodied by Reinhold Niebuhr (see: (Lovin 2008, 1995; Patterson 2008)) 
to more political types, emblematically expressed through the work of Hans 
Morgenthau (see: (M. C. Williams 2007; Scheuerman 2009)) What unites these 
positions is the notion that pacifism disregards the importance of power relations and 
stable orders in both domestic and international politics. On the complexity of realism, 
cutting across political theory and international relations, see representatively: 
(McQueen 2018; Sleat 2013). 
3 The most famous discussion of revolutionary violence in the second half of the 20th 
Century stems from Frantz Fanon (2004). Fanon’s argument is, in a nutshell, that the 
process of decolonization relies on a revolutionary politics that manages to transform 
the settler-colonial world through reactive and redemptive violence. Note, though, 
that his critique of nonviolence as bourgeois entitlement is much subtler than the 
widely held perception of Fanon as a prophet of ruthless vengeance intimates. See: 
(Frazer and Hutchings 2008; Kawash 1999; Tronto 2004). 
4 On these two strands within Just War thinking see: (O’Driscoll 2013; Lazar 2017; 
Braun 2018). 
5 This suspicion has a long history: already Immanuel Kant (2006, 79) denounced the 
founding fathers of modern Just War theory, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and 
Emer de Vattel, as “tiresome comforters”. See: (H. Williams 2012). 
6 Winter’s terminology resonates with Elise Boulding’s comparison between micro- 
and macro-level utopias. See: (E. Boulding 1986). 
7 See also: (Jameson 2005, 170). 
8 Regarding this aspect, Jameson’s discussion of utopia’s “spatial closure” is insightful. 
See: (Jameson 1982, 154–55). 
9 This view is also pivotal for Erik Olin Wright’s long-term project of examining “real 
utopias”. See: (Wright 2010, 2013). Another expression of this thought, which remains 
however much more speculative than Wright’s, can be found in John Rawls’s late 
work. See: (Rawls 1999, 7, 11–12) On Rawls see: (Arnsperger 2006; Böker 2017). 
10 In that respect, the perspective of minor, grounded utopianism resonates with recent 
attempts to revisit the linkages between realist political theory and utopianism. See: 
(Geuss 2015; Raekstad 2018; McKean 2016). 
11 For an attempt to describe the Civil Rights movement as an exemplar of grounded 
utopianism see: (Shor 2004). 
12 For a selection of her writings see: (J. R. Boulding 2017). Boulding’s research into 
processes of social transformation has had tangible impact on the fields of future and 
peace studies. See: (Hutchinson and Milojević 2012). 
13 See also: (Ruddick 1989; Frazer and Hutchings 2014). 
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14 This point also raises some hard questions about Amnesty’s neutrality; whether its 
equidistance is perhaps just a façade behind which ideological support for a liberal 
creed or worldview remains hidden. See: (Mutua 2001). 
15 “All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. 
Fail better.” (Beckett 1989, 101). Lucy Sargisson (2014, 243) also finds Beckett’s 
dictum beneficial for capturing utopianism’s impetus. 
16 See: (Franks 2006). While I do not explore the deeper links between anarchism and 
pacifism in this paper, it is worthwhile to gesture to the vibrant debate around 
anarcho-pacifism, which rehearses many of the themes that I capture through the lens 
of utopianism. See: (Llewellyn 2018; Moses 2018). 
17 Although it is true that the US retreat from Vietnam was not immediately 
precipitated by the protests, the “Vietnam syndrome” (the widespread distaste for 
futile interventionism abroad) inhibited US foreign policy for almost three decades to 
come. See: (Herring 2011). 
